Αρκτούρος: Protecting Biodiversity Against the Effects of Climate Change Through the Endangered Species Act by Chen, James Ming
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 
Volume 47 Intellectual Property: From Biodiversity to Technical Standards 
2015 
Αρκτούρος: Protecting Biodiversity Against the Effects of 
Climate Change Through the Endangered Species Act 
James Ming Chen 
Michigan State University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
James Ming Chen, Αρκτούρος: Protecting Biodiversity Against the Effects of Climate Change Through 
the Endangered Species Act, 47 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 011 (2015), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol47/iss1/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Journal of Law & Policy by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
11 
Αρκτούρος: 
Protecting Biodiversity Against the Effects of Climate 
Change Through the Endangered Species Act 
James Ming Chen

 
During the Phanerozoic Eon, a span of 542 million years from the 
initial emergence of hard-shelled animals to the present,
1
 the earth 
has experienced at least five catastrophic losses of biodiversity: the 
Ordovician-Silurian, the late Devonian, the Permian-Triassic, the 
Triassic-Jurassic, and the Cretaceous-Paleogene extinction events.
2
 
Climate change is driving a sixth great death spasm,
3
 one that 
deserves to be called the Anthropocene extinction.
4
 Large-scale 
 
 
 Justin Smith Morrill Chair in Law, Michigan State University; Of Counsel, 
Technology Law Group of Washington, D.C. I originally presented this material at the Journal 
of Animal & Natural Resource Law’s symposium, “Deforestation and Biodiversity Loss in a 
Climate Change Context,” held at the Michigan State University College of Law on March 28, 
2014. I appreciate comments by David N. Cassuto, David Favre, Gil Grantmore, Augusta 
Brown Holland, and E. Andrew Long. Special thanks to Heather Elaine Worland Chen. 
 1. See, e.g., Alexander V. Markov & Andrey V. Korotayev, Phanerozoic Marine 
Biodiversity Follows a Hyperbolic Trend, 16 PALAEOWORLD 311 (2007); Kenneth G. Miller et 
al., The Phanerozoic Record of Global Sea-Level Change, 310 SCIENCE 1293 (2005). The term 
Phanerozoic is derived from the ancient Greek words φανερός and ζωή, which together mean 
“visible life.” 
 2. See David M. Raup & J. John Sepkoski, Jr., Mass Extinctions in the Marine Fossil 
Record, 215 SCIENCE 1501 (1982). Nearly everyone of a certain age knows the Cretaceous-
Paleogene extinction by a different name, the Cretaceous-Tertiary. The International 
Commission on Stratigraphy has deprecated the term Tertiary and substituted the terms 
Paleogene and Neogene as designations for the periods of the Cenozoic Era. But this decision 
trashes “terminology with nearly 250 years of history” and contradicts popular references to 
“the extinction of the dinosaurs at the Cretaceous-Tertiary (or K-T) boundary.” Robert A. 
Rohde, Whatever Happened to the Tertiary and Quaternary?, Jan. 18, 2005, available at 
http://stratigraphy.org/bak/geowhen/TQ.html. 
 3. See, e.g., ELIZABETH KOLBERT, THE SIXTH EXTINCTION: AN UNNATURAL HISTORY 
(2014); RICHARD LEAKEY & ROGER LEWIN, THE SIXTH EXTINCTION: PATTERNS OF LIFE AND 
THE FUTURE OF MANKIND (1996). 
 4. See, e.g., Will Steffen, Jacques Grinewald, Paul Crutzen & John McNeill, The 
Anthropocene: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives, 369 PHIL. TRANS. ROYAL SOC’Y A 843 
(2011); Jan Zalasiewicz et al., The New World of the Anthropocene, 44 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 
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habitat destruction puts many plant and animal species at the risk of 
extinction. Although “organisms respond to climate and climatic 
change in a variety of ways, depending on the nature, rate and 
duration of the change, and the range of available biological 
responses,”5 paleontology has connected “[t]he three best-studied 
mass extinction events” to “sharp changes in climate.”6 Humility 
about the human impact on natural history and the biosphere provides 
ample reason to presume “that rapid shifts in climate can reduce 
global diversity.”7 
In a 2005 survey of biodiversity law that I conducted at the behest 
of Charles R. McManis, I did not discuss climate change in detail, 
even as I acknowledged the phenomenon as a “potent driver of 
ecological ruin and evolutionary change.”8 In this tribute to Professor 
McManis on the occasion of his retirement, I now wish to address 
this scholarly oversight. 
In fairness to my decision to reserve that discussion for “another 
time, though not necessarily another scholar,”9 both law and science 
have achieved a considerably stronger basis over the past decade for 
addressing biodiversity loss attributable to climate change. Scientific 
evidence attributing severe, even catastrophic, climate change to 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases has long passed the 
point of reasonable doubt.
10
 
For their part, federal courts have lost patience with expert 
agencies’ pleas that scientific uncertainty warrants further study 
 
2228 (2010). The term Anthropocene is derived from ἄνθρωπος and καινός, the ancient Greek 
words for human and new (or recent). 
 5. Douglas H. Erwin, Climate as a Driver of Evolutionary Change, 19 CURRENT BIOL. 
R575, R575 (2009). See generally Camille Parmesan, Ecological and Evolutionary Response to 
Recent Climate Change, 37 ANN. REV. ECOL. EVOLUTIONARY SYS. 637 (2006). 
 6. Erwin, supra note 5, at R581. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Jim Chen, Across the Apocalypse on Horseback: Imperfect Legal Responses to 
Biodiversity Loss, 17 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 12, 31 (2005). 
 9. Jim Chen, A Vision Softly Creeping: Congressional Acquiescence and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1764, 1795 (2004). 
 10. Solely on the narrow question of climatic impacts on Arctic Ocean sea ice, exemplary 
citations include Michael A. Alexander, K. Halimeda Kilbourne & Janet A. Nye, Climate 
Variability During Warm and Cold Phases of the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO), 
1871–2008, 133 J. MARINE SYS. 14 (2014); Elizabeth N. Cassano, John J. Cassano, Matthew E. 
Higgins & Mark C. Serreze, Atmospheric Impacts of an Arctic Sea Ice Minimum as Seen in the 
Community Atmosphere Model, 34 INT’L J. CLIMATOLOGY 766 (2014). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol47/iss1/8
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before concrete action. As the Supreme Court noted in the landmark 
2007 case of Massachusetts v. EPA,
11
 no agency can “avoid its 
statutory obligation” to enforce federal environmental law “by noting 
the uncertainty surrounding various features of climate change and 
concluding that it would therefore be better not to regulate at this 
time.”12 Because the relevant “statutory question is whether sufficient 
information exists to make an endangerment finding,” and not 
whether the agency “would prefer not to regulate greenhouse gases 
because of some residual uncertainty,” an agency wishing to defer “a 
reasoned judgment as to whether greenhouse gases contribute to 
global warming” must explicitly declare that “the scientific 
uncertainty is so profound” as to paralyze the agency as a matter of 
law.
13
 
Meanwhile, an agency that does proceed in the face of some 
uncertainty will find ample judicial deference, especially where its 
statutory authority “is ‘precautionary in nature’ and ‘designed to 
protect the public health,’ and the relevant evidence is ‘difficult to 
come by, uncertain, or conflicting because it is on the frontiers of 
scientific knowledge.’”14 Reviewing courts remain painfully aware 
that they lack the “training [and] experience” that a “chemist, 
biologist or statistician” might apply to a controversy involving 
biodiversity and climate change.
15
 
In the United States alone, many legal tools are emerging as 
instruments of climate change policymaking. For example, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has not only the authority 
but also the obligation under the Clean Air Act to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles.
16
 The Energy 
Policy and Conservation Act
17
 and the National Environmental 
Policy Act
18
 require the National Highway Transportation Safety 
 
 11. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 12. Id. at 534. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 121 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(quoting Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir.1976)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub 
nom. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014). 
 15. Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 36. 
 16. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 17. 49 U.S.C. §§ 32901–32919. 
 18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370e. 
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Administration to address carbon emissions through corporate 
average fuel efficiency (CAFE) standards, or at least to explain why 
the agency has declined to adopt more stringent CAFE standards.
19
 
This Essay will focus on one specific climate change strategy 
under federal environmental law: the use of the Endangered Species 
Act
20
 to protect biodiversity from the effects of climate change. 
Whatever its shortcomings, the Act deserves credit for “preventing 
the ultimate extinction of the vast majority of protected species.”21 
The application of the Act to species most immediately menaced by 
climate change offers a promising set of remedies for the seemingly 
relentless emission of greenhouse gases and the anthropogenic 
contribution to global climate change.  
The Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Marine 
Fisheries Service (NMFS) (known together as the “Services”) 
collectively enforce the Act. The FWS administers the Act for 
terrestrial and freshwater species, while the NMFS administers the 
Act for most marine species.
22
 A species is defined as endangered if 
it “is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of 
its range.”23 A threatened species is one “which is likely to become 
an endangered species within the foreseeable future.”24 
Of particular interest in the context of climate change is the time 
frame deemed foreseeable. Because neither the Act nor its 
implementing regulations define the term foreseeable future, the 
Services determine foreseeability on a case-by-case basis.
25
 
Definitions of foreseeability have varied considerably. One federal 
district court has declined to decide whether a risk that the coho 
 
 19. See Coalition for Biological Diversity v. National Highway Transp. Safety Admin., 
538 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008); Coalition for Biological Diversity v. National Highway Transp. 
Safety Admin., 508 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 20. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2015). Subsequent statutory references will cite both the 
Act and its codified form in the United States Code. 
 21. J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to the 
No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2008). 
 22. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.01. Maritime mammals straddle both sides of this jurisdictional 
divide. Polar bears, dugongs, walruses, and sea otters fall on the FWS side. The NMFS governs 
whales, dolphins, and seals. Id. 
 23. E.S.A. § 3(6), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6). 
 24. E.S.A. § 3(20), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20). 
 25. See In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing & Section 4(d) Rule Litig., 709 
F.3d 1, 15 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 310 (2013). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol47/iss1/8
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salmon might become endangered within “30 or 100 years” satisfied 
the statutory definition of foreseeable future, because an 
administrative determination that this species “would not become 
endangered within the next two years” would “fall[] far short of any 
reasonable definition of the ‘foreseeable future.’”26 Another court has 
noted—albeit without endorsement or rejection—the assumption that 
twenty-four years constitutes the “foreseeable future” for purposes of 
predicting the likelihood of endangerment.
27
 In listing decisions 
involving salamanders, foreseeability has been set at forty years.
28
 By 
contrast, one court has held that the same forty-year time horizon, 
from 2010 to 2050, as identified in projections of deleterious effects 
from climate change, was not sufficiently foreseeable to warrant the 
listing of the ribbon seal as a threatened species.
29
 The FWS, of its 
own accord, has declined to list the American pika as threatened or 
endangered on the basis of climate change risks beyond 2050.
30
 
Listing as an endangered or threatened species is a prerequisite to 
protection under the Act. The Services must base their listing 
decisions on five factors:
31
 
1. The present or threatened destruction, modification, or 
curtailment of a species’ habitat or range 
2. The overutilization of a species for commercial, 
recreational, scientific, or educational purposes 
3. Disease or predation 
4. The inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms 
5. Other natural or manmade factors affecting a species’ 
continued existence 
 
 26. Oregon Natural Res. Council v. Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1151 (D. Or. 1998). 
 27. See Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, 645 F. Supp. 2d 929, 954 n.18 (D. Or. 2007), aff’d, 559 
F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 28. See Siskiyou Mountains Salamander (Plethodon stormi) & Scott Bar Salamander 
(Plethodon asupak), 73 Fed. Reg. 4380, 4381 (Jan. 24, 2008). 
 29. See Center for Biological Diversity v. Lubchenco, 758 F. Supp. 2d 945 (N.D. Cal. 
2010). 
 30. See Twelve-Month Finding on a Petition to List the American Pika as Threatened or 
Endangered, 75 Fed. Reg. 6,438 (Feb. 9, 2010). 
 31. See E.S.A. § 4(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a). 
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The decision to list rests solely on biological grounds and must be 
made “without reference to possible economic or other impacts of 
[that] determination.”32 Moreover, listing decisions must be made 
“solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data 
available.”33 The requirement to use the best available data is not 
tantamount to a command to seek and apply “the best . . . possible” 
data.
34
 Rather, this requirement prevents the Services from 
disregarding evidence that is better than the scientific basis on which 
the Services do base their listing decisions.
35
 
After listing a species as endangered or threatened, the Services 
must also designate critical habitat “to the maximum extent prudent 
and determinable.”36 Critical habitat includes areas containing 
“physical and biological features” that are “essential to the 
conservation of the species and which may require special 
management considerations or protection.”37 Critical habitat may also 
include areas outside a species’ current range if such habitat is 
essential to the conservation of that species.
38
 Although the 
designation of critical habitat must “tak[e] into consideration the 
economic impact” of designating any particular area, the Services 
may not deny the critical habitat designation to any area where the 
“best scientific and commercial data available” indicate that “the 
failure to designate such area as critical habitat will result in the 
extinction of the species.”39 
Because the Act aspires not merely to “halt” but also to “reverse 
the trend towards” biodiversity loss,40 the Act directs the Services to 
develop a recovery plan aimed at improving the status of each listed 
species so that listing is no longer necessary.
41
 A recovery plan must 
 
 32. 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(b). 
 33. E.S.A. § 4(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b). 
 34. Building Indus. Ass’n of Superior Cal. v. Norton, 247 F.3d 1241, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (emphasis added). 
 35. City of Las Vegas v. Lujan, 891 F.2d 927, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1989); accord In re Polar 
Bear Endangered Species Act Listing & § 4(d) Rule Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 65, 106 (D.C. Cir. 
2011), aff’d, 709 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 310 (2013). 
 36. E.S.A. § 4(a)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3). 
 37. E.S.A. § 3(5)(A)(i), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(i). 
 38. See E.S.A. § 3(5)(A)(ii), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii). 
 39. E.S.A. § 4(b)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). 
 40. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978). 
 41. See E.S.A. § 4(f), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol47/iss1/8
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identify “management actions necessary . . . for the conservation and 
survival of the species,” to the point of either “recommend[ing] 
corrective action” or explaining why such action “is impracticable or 
unnecessary.”42 Although a recovery plan need not specify a precise 
timetable, it must include estimates for the time needed to perform 
recovery measures.
43
 The ultimate factors for delisting a species are 
the same as those that inform the decision to list a species as 
endangered or threatened.
44
 
Section 7 of the Act requires each federal agency to ensure that its 
actions are “not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any 
endangered or threatened species or result in the destruction or 
adverse modification of [critical] habitat.”45 The jeopardy prong of 
Section 7 addresses the impact of agency action on the survival and 
recovery of a listed species.
46
 By contrast, the adverse modification 
prong concerns critical habitat. A determination that proposed agency 
action “may affect” a listed species or its critical habitat triggers the 
obligation to formally consult the FWS or NMFS, as appropriate.
47
 
Formal consultation under Section 7 typically results in the 
issuance of a biological opinion evaluating jeopardy to a listed 
species’ continued existence and adverse modification of its habitat.48 
At the very least, where a biological opinion has found that proposed 
federal action will directly affect a listed species for reasons 
independent of climate change, that biological opinion must also 
address the cumulative effects of climate change on that species.
49
 In 
this regard, the obligation to examine climate change in biological 
opinions that have already found direct, non-climate-related impacts 
on a listed species resembles an existing strategy for regulating 
greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act. The EPA has 
invoked its so-called “anyway” authority to require the installation of 
 
 42. Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 903 F. Supp. 96, 108 (D.D.C. 1995). 
 43. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, 130 F. Supp. 2d 121, 134 (D.D.C. 2001). 
 44. See Fund for Animals, 903 F. Supp. at 111. 
 45. E.S.A. § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); accord Hill, 437 U.S. at 183–84. 
 46. See Sierra Club v. U. S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 441 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 47. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 158 (1997). 
 48. See E.S.A. § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14. 
 49. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g); Pacific Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Gutierrez, 
606 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1184 (E.D. Cal. 2008); Natural Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 506 F. 
Supp. 2d 322, 374–76 (E.D. Cal. 2007). 
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the best available control technology for greenhouse gases at 
facilities whose emissions of conventional pollutants would subject 
them to the EPA’s permitting authority under Title V and/or the 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration provisions of the Clean Air 
Act.
50
 
It is not statutory language, but administrative practice and 
judicial review that have infused the Endangered Species Act with 
the power to address climate change. As a textual matter, the Act 
does not obligate the Services, in their discharge of their obligations 
under Sections 4 and 7, to consider the impact of climate change.
51
 
Nor does the Act require that the Services account for climate change 
in their critical habitat designation decisions.
52
 The proclamation that 
the Act contains “no statutory requirement” compelling the Services 
“to consider climate change in [their] listing decisions”53 echoes 
judicial sentiments expressed a generation earlier. In the 1990s, 
federal courts had opined that conservation biology—a diverse 
science whose concerns span “population dynamics, species turnover, 
patch size, recolonization problems, fragmentation problems, edge 
effects, and island biogeography”—need not guide federal 
administrative decisionmaking.
54
 
More recent judicial decisions have breathed new power into the 
Endangered Species Act as a legal tool for addressing the effects of 
climate change. The Ninth Circuit decided in 2011 to invalidate the 
Fish and Wildlife Service’s attempt to delist Yellowstone grizzly 
bears as a threatened species, on the grounds that the Service had 
 
 50. See Utility Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2447–49 (2014). 
 51. See Colorado River Cutthroat Trout v. Salazar, 898 F. Supp. 2d 191, 206-07 (D.D.C. 
2012). 
 52. See Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Lyder, 728 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1140 (D. Mont. 
2010). 
 53. Colorado River Cutthroat Trout, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 207; see also Interagency 
Cooperation Under the Endangered Species Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 47,686, 47,872 (Aug. 15, 2008) 
(opining that federal agencies face “no requirement to consult” the NMFS or FWS “on 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions’ contribution to global warming and its associated impacts on 
listed species”). 
 54. Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 618–20 (7th Cir. 1995); see also id. at 623 
(declining to transform even valid “general theor[ies]” of science “into a management tool 
unless [an agency] can apply it to a concrete situation”); Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 903 F. 
Supp. 96, 106 (D.D.C. 1995) (declining to endorse specific techniques for managing “distinct 
geographic ecosystems . . . inhabited by grizzly bears”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol47/iss1/8
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failed to properly account for the impact of climate change on the 
whitebark pine, a primary source of food for grizzlies.
55
 The climate-
driven loss of whitebark pine trees could foreseeably increase 
conflicts between bears and humans and thereby harm the bears’ 
prospects for reproductive success and overall survival.
56
 
Thanks to its breadth, Section 7’s requirement that other federal 
agencies consult the FWS or NMFS if proposed action “may affect” a 
listed species or its critical habitat has the potential to cover “any 
action that results in non-trivial net increases” in greenhouse gases.57 
As between administrative discretion and judicial review, more 
aggressive enforcement of the Endangered Species Act by the 
Services will have greater impact on efforts to mitigate climate 
change. Because reviewing courts are admonished “not to substitute 
[their] judgment for that of [an] agency,” especially where disputed 
matters involve “a high level of technical expertise,”58 courts will 
hesitate to reverse agency action on the basis of challenges 
“amount[ing] to nothing more than competing views about policy and 
science.”59 
Section 9’s prohibition against the “tak[ing]” of endangered 
species
60
 dramatically expands the scope of the Act from agencies of 
the federal government to all actors, including the entire private 
sector. Notably, the Act does not directly prohibit the taking of a 
threatened species. Section 9, however, does punish the “violat[ion 
of] any regulation pertaining . . . to any threatened species of fish or 
 
 55. See Greater Yellowstone Coal., Inc. v. Servheen, 665 F.3d 1015, 1026 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 56. See id. 
 57. John Kostyack & Dan Rohlf, Conserving Endangered Species in an Era of Global 
Warming, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,203, 10,212 (2008); see also Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. at 
331–32 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (ordering the Bureau of Reclamation, under authority of § 7 of the 
Endangered Species Act, to consult with FWS regarding the impact of climate change on the 
threatened Delta smelt [Hypomesus transpacificus]); Ruhl, supra note 21, at 45–46 (discussing 
NRDC v. Kempthorne). 
 58. Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989). 
 59. In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing & Section 4(d) Rule Litig., 709 F.3d 
1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 60. See E.S.A. § 9(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (“it is unlawful for any person subject to 
the jurisdiction of the United States to . . . take any [endangered] species within the United 
States or the territorial sea of the United States [or] take any such species upon the high seas”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 47:11 
 
 
wildlife listed pursuant to” Section 4 of the Act.61 By regulation, the 
Services have defined the taking of a threatened species as a violation 
of Section 9.
62
  
The statutory definition of take and its administrative 
interpretation are the true source of legal power in Section 9’s 
prohibition against the taking of endangered species. The Act defines 
take to mean “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, 
capture, or collect” a member of an endangered species.63 In turn, 
regulations issued by the Services have defined the term harm as 
including “significant habitat modification or degradation” adversely 
affecting an endangered or threatened species, with no regard to 
intent to injure any individual specimen. The celebrated Supreme 
Court case of Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a 
Great Oregon
64
 upheld the application of these expanded definitions 
of take and harm to significant habitat modification. 
With a reach that exceeds that of Sections 4 and 7, Section 9 may 
yet be construed to treat greenhouse gas emissions as a legally critical 
link in a causal chain leading to the unlawful “taking” of an 
endangered species.
65
 The application of Section 9 to climate change 
would represent a significant step beyond Justice O’Connor’s Sweet 
Home concurrence, which emphasized limitations imposed “by 
ordinary principles of proximate causation,” including embedded 
“notions of foreseeability,”66 in order to curb the perceived excesses 
of the Ninth Circuit’s 1988 Palila decision.67 In 1995 Justice 
O’Connor questioned whether Section 9 could be lawfully construed 
to reach destruction of the palila bird’s habitat in Hawaii through 
sheep-grazing. The question in 2015 is whether Section 9 may be 
 
 61. E.S.A. § 9(a)(1)(G), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(G); see also E.S.A. § 4(d), 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1533(d) (“The Secretary may by regulation prohibit with respect to any threatened species 
any act prohibited under section 1538(a)(1) of this title, in the case of fish or wildlife, or section 
1538(a)(2) of this title, in the case of plants, with respect to endangered species”). 
 62. 50 C.F.R. § 17.31. 
 63. E.S.A. § 3(19), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19). 
 64. 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
 65. See Brendan Cummings & Kassie R. Siegel, Ursus maritimus: Polar Bears on Thin 
Ice, 22 NATURAL RES. & ENV’T 3, 4, 7 (2007). 
 66. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 709 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 67. See Palila v. Hawaii Dep’t of Land & Natural Res., 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol47/iss1/8
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applied to significant modification or degradation of habitat traceable 
to anthropogenic climate change.  
Climate change has figured prominently in both listing and critical 
habitat designation decisions for species ranging from subtropical 
elkhorn and staghorn coral
68
 to sage grouse and wolverine on the 
North American mainland
69
 and bearded and ringed seals in northern 
seas.
70
 Nevertheless, Endangered Species Act cases addressing 
climate change have extended the law’s longstanding tendency to 
focus on “large, charismatic fauna over all other threats to 
biodiversity.”71 The signature battle over the application of the Act to 
 
 68. See Center for Biological Diversity v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 977 F. Supp. 
2d 55 (D.P.R. 2013); Final Listing Determinations for Elkhorn Coral & Staghorn Coral, 71 Fed. 
Reg. 26,852 (May 9, 2006) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 223); Critical Habitat for Threatened 
Elkhorn & Staghorn Corals, 73 Fed. Reg. 72,210 (Nov. 26, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. 
pts. 223, 226). See generally Blake Armstrong, Note, Maintaining the World’s Marine 
Biodiversity: Using the Endangered Species Act to Stop the Climate Change Induced Loss of 
Coral Reefs, 18 HASTINGS W-NW. J. ENVT’L L. & POL’Y 429 (2012). 
 69. See American Lands Alliance v. Norton, 242 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2003) 
(identifying climate change as a factor favoring the listing of the Gunnison sage grouse as an 
endangered species); Endangered Status for Gunnison Sage-Grouse, 78 Fed. Reg. 2486 
(proposed Jan. 11, 2013) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17); Threatened Status for the Distinct 
Population Segment of the North American Wolverine Occurring in the Contiguous United 
States, 78 Fed. Reg. 7865 (proposed Feb. 4, 2013) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17); cf. 
Friends of the Wild Swan, Inc. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1127–28 (D. 
Or. 1997) (acknowledging the vulnerability of the bull trout to climate change). See generally 
Michael C. Blumm & Kya B. Marienfeld, Endangered Species Act Listings and Climate 
Change: Avoiding the Elephant in the Room, 20 ANIMAL L. 277, 294–305 (2014) (discussing 
the sage grouse and wolverine listing decisions); Robin Kundis Craig, Climate Change, 
Regulatory Fragmentation, and Water Triage, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 825, 879–80 (2008) 
(discussing American Lands Alliance, Wild Swan, and the Acropora coral listing decision). 
 70. See Threatened Status for the Beringia and Okhotsk Distinct Population Segments of 
the Erignathus barbatus nauticus Subspecies of the Bearded Seal, 77 Fed. Reg. 76,740 (Dec. 
28, 2012); Threatened Status for the Arctic, Okhotsk, and Baltic Subspecies of the Ringed Seal 
and Endangered Status for the Lagoda Subspecies of the Ringed Seal, 77 Fed. Reg. 76,706 
(Dec. 28, 2012); cf. Greenpeace v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 237 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1188 
(W.D. Wash. 2002) (recognizing the impact of climate change on reductions in the population 
of the Stellar sea lion). The FWS has designated the Pacific walrus as a candidate for threatened 
status, but has not yet listed that species. See Twelve-Month Finding to List the Pacific Walrus 
as Threatened or Endangered, 76 Fed. Reg. 7634 (Feb. 10, 2011). 
 71. Chen, supra note 8, at 17. See generally Nigel Leader-Williams & Holly T. Dublin, 
Charismatic Megafauna as “Flagship Species,” in PRIORITIES FOR THE CONSERVATION OF 
MAMMALIAN DIVERSITY: HAS THE PANDA HAD ITS DAY?, at 53 (2000) (urging the de-
emphasis of large mammals in favor of more holistic conservation models that integrate social 
concerns with biological concerns encompassing multiple species and biodiversity at large); 
Diogo Verissimo, Douglas C. MacMillan & Robert J. Smith, Toward a Systematic Approach 
for Identifying Conservation Flagships, 4 CONSERVATION LETTERS 1 (2011) (proposing a new 
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climate change has involved, quite unsurprisingly, the polar bear.
72
 
Litigation has swamped all aspects of the FWS’s efforts to protect the 
polar bear, from its listing as a threatened species
73
 to the designation 
of large portions of the Arctic as critical habitat
74
 and the application 
of Section 9’s prohibition against takings of polar bears.75 
The English word Arctic, after all, stems from the Greek word for 
bear, in honor of the constellation that other ancient people called 
Ursa Major.
76
 Arcturus, the celebrated northern star, means the 
“guardian of the bear.”77 While courts debate legal remedies for the 
loss of human habitats in polar regions,
78
 the existential threat to the 
 
definition of flagship species that emphasizes the role of charismatic megafauna in promoting 
awareness of and support for biodiversity conservation). 
 72. See generally Louis A. Di Leo, The Polar Bear Ethic: From the Reactionary Trend in 
Environmental Lawmaking to the Climate Change Imperative, 28 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 347 
(2013); Maggie Kuhn, Note, Climate Change and the Polar Bear: Is the Endangered Species 
Act Up to the Task?, 27 ALASKA L. REV. 125 (2010). 
 73. See In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing & Section 4(d) Rule Litig., 709 
F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 310 (2013). 
 74. See Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Salazar, 916 F. Supp. 2d 974 (D. Alaska 2013). 
 75. See In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing & Section 4(d) Rule Litig., 818 
F. Supp. 2d 214 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 76. Douglas Harper, Artic definition, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, available at 
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=arctic. The Greek form of the word is άρκτος, as 
in πολική άρκτος (polar bear). 
 77. Douglas Harper, Arcturus definition, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, available at 
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=arcturus. This Essay takes its name from the 
ancient Greek form of Arcturus: Αρκτούρος. 
 78. See Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 876 (N.D. 
Cal. 2009), aff’d, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012) (describing “the harm from global warming” as 
a causally remote “series of events disconnected from the discharge” of “greenhouse gases,” 
which must then “combine with other gases in the atmosphere which in turn results in the planet 
retaining heat, which in turn causes the ice caps to melt and the oceans to rise, which in turn 
causes the Arctic sea ice to melt, which in turn allegedly renders Kivalina [and other polar 
communities] vulnerable to erosion and deterioration resulting from winter storms”); see also 
Native Village of Point Hope v. Salazar, 680 F.3d 1123, 1135 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming the 
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management’s conclusion that an Arctic oil exploration plan would 
not “probably cause serious harm or damage” to life, property or the human, marine, or coastal 
environment in violation of 43 U.S.C. §§ 1334(a)(2)(A)(i), 1340(c)(1), 30 C.F.R. §§ 550.202, 
550.233). Compare American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011) 
(holding that “the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any federal common 
law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants”), 
with City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 318–19 (1981) (holding that the Water 
Pollution Act Amendments of 1972 displaced federal common law claims arising from a 
sewage discharge). See generally Hari M. Osofsky, The Inuit Petition as a Bridge? Beyond 
Dialectics of Climate Change and Indigenous People’s Rights, 31 AM. IND. L. REV. 675 (2007); 
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polar bear has spurred legal action against the vectors of 
anthropogenically induced climate change. 
In 2008 the FWS listed the polar bear as threatened by the effects 
of climate change on the bear’s Arctic habitat.79 Although the FWS 
initially declined to designate critical habitat for the polar bear, it 
dramatically reversed course in 2010 by designating 187,157 square 
miles in Alaska and adjacent waters of the United States and its 
territories:
80
 
 
 
Matthew Gerhart, Comment, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: The Difficulty 
of Proving Causation, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 167 (2009). 
 79. See Determination of Threatened Status for the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) 
Throughout Its Range, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,212 (2008) [hereinafter Polar Bear Listing 
Determination], codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17. 
 80. See Designation of Critical Habitat for the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) in the United 
States, 75 Fed. Reg. 76,085, 76,088 (Dec. 7, 2010), codified in 50 C.F.R. pt. 17, available at 
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2010/12/07/2010-29925/endangered-and-threatened-
wildlife-and-plants-designation-of-critical-habitat-for-the-polar-bear#t-1 
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Of central importance to the listing of the polar bear and to the 
designation of its habitat as critical is the existential threat that 
climate change poses to Arctic sea ice.
81
 A sympathetic D.C. Circuit 
recognized that irreversible “changes to the polar bear's habitat will 
soon pose an existential threat to the species”:82 
Productivity, abundance, and availability of ice seals, the polar 
bear's primary prey base, would be diminished by the projected 
loss of sea ice, and energetic requirements of polar bears for 
movement and obtaining food would increase. Access to 
traditional denning areas would be affected. In turn, these 
factors would cause declines in the condition of polar bears 
from nutritional stress and reduced productivity. As already 
evidenced in the Western Hudson Bay and Southern Beaufort 
Sea populations, polar bears would experience reductions in 
survival and recruitment rates. The eventual effect is that polar 
bear populations would decline. The rate and magnitude of 
decline would vary among populations, based on differences in 
the rate, timing, and magnitude of impacts. However, within 
the foreseeable future, all populations would be affected, and 
the species is likely to become in danger of extinction 
throughout all of its range due to declining sea ice habitat.
83
 
Indeed, even the color of ice itself contributes to a significant 
albedo effect: as ice melts, the darkening of the sea or land surface 
absorbs more solar energy and accelerates global warming even 
more.
84
 Albedo has sufficient climatic impact to warrant serious 
consideration of geoengineering projects designed to alter the color 
 
 81. See Polar Bear Listing Determination, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,212, 50 C.F.R. pt. 17. 
 82. In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing & Section 4(d) Rule Litig., 709 F.3d 
1, 6 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 310 (2013). 
 83. Id. (quoting Polar Bear Listing Determination, 73 Fed. Reg. at 28,292–93). This 
passage echoes the Supreme Court’s endorsement of the FWS’s identification of mortal threats 
to the snail darter in TVA v. Hill, TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 162 (1978): “[T]he snail darter 
occurs only in the swifter portions of shoals over clean gravel substrate in cool, low-turbidity 
water. Food of the snail darter is almost exclusively snails, which require a clean gravel 
substrate for their survival. The proposed impoundment of water behind the proposed Tellico 
Dam would result in total destruction of the snail darter's habitat.” 
 84. See Polar Bear Listing Determination, 73 Fed. Reg. at 28,225. 
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of the earth,
85
 even to the point of turning the daytime sky from blue 
to white.
 86
 
Federal courts have upheld most aspects of the FWS’s polar bear 
decisions.
87
 The United States District Court for the District of 
Alaska did invalidate the FWS’s designation of Unit 2, a stretch of 
northern Alaska spanning the Canadian border and the town of 
Barrow, because the FWS used its finding of a need to isolate polar 
bear dens from humans and human activities, an “essential feature” 
of Unit 2 that constituted only “approximately one percent of the 
entire area,” as an improper basis for “designat[ing] a large swath of 
land . . . as ‘critical habitat.’”88 
For its part, the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia has rejected a challenge to the FWS’s decision to limit the 
protection of polar bears under Section 9 of the Act according to 
exemptions granted by the Marine Mammal Protection Act
89
 and the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
90
 and to 
refrain from enforcing Section 9 to activities outside the polar bears’ 
range, notwithstanding those activities’ incidental impact on polar 
bears.
91
 Using its authority under the Marine Mammal Protection 
Act,
92
 the FWS has routinely authorized nonlethal, incidental takings 
 
 85. See, e.g., Peter J. Irvine, Andy Ridgwell & Daniel J. Lunt, Climatic Effects of Surface 
Albedo Engineering, 116 J. GEOPHYS. RES. D24,112 (2011); Joy S. Singareyer, Andy Ridgwell 
& Peter Irvine, Assessing the Benefits of Crop Albedo Bio-Geoengineering, 4 ENVTL. RES. 
LETTERS 045110 (2009). 
 86. See Giovanni Pitari et al., Stratospheric Ozone Response to Sulfate Geoengineering: 
Results from the Geoengineering Model Intercomparison Project, 4 J. GEOPHYS. RES. 2629 
(2014). 
 87. See generally Alanna Kearney, Casenote, The Battle May Be Over, But What About 
the War? Examining the ESA in the Crusade Against Global Warming After In Re Polar Bear 
Endangered Species Act Listing and Section 4(d) Rule Litigation, 25 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 529 
(2014). 
 88. Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Salazar, 916 F. Supp. 2d 974, 1001-02 (D. Alaska 2013). 
 89. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1373–1374. 
 90. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 
signed at Washington, D.C., on March 3, 1973, art. VII, 27 U.S.T. 1087, TIAS 8249 
(“Exemptions and Other Special Provisions Relating to Trade”). 
 91. See In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing & Section 4(d) Rule Litig., 818 
F. Supp. 2d 214, 222–23 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 709 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
310 (2013). 
 92. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(5)(A). 
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of polar bears and Pacific walruses.
93
 The authority to permit 
incidental takings requires the Service to determine that such takings 
will have no more than a “negligible impact” on the affected 
population.
94
 
Humanity’s alteration of ecology to suit its own needs and tastes 
has triggered multiple regime shifts in terrestrial and aquatic 
environments.
95
 If complex adaptive ecosystems are to regain their 
capacity to deliver services that humans prize, human institutions 
such as the law must work to sustain surviving ecosystems and to 
transform degraded ecosystems.
96
 Although the law offers no 
conclusive answer to the question of “whether the [Endangered 
Species Act] is an effective or appropriate tool to address the threat of 
climate change,”97 climate change and biodiversity conservation 
remain the most important things that the law can address.
98
 
The brief legal record of applying the Endangered Species Act to 
climate change has already shifted the policymaking terrain. Legal 
recognition of the ecological threat that climate change poses to the 
biosphere pays homage to the scholarly legacy of Charles R. 
McManis.  Professor McManis’s work, after all, has always reflected 
the understanding that technological innovation depends on the 
conservation of biological diversity.
 99
 
 
 93. See Center for Biological Diversity v. Salazar, 695 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2012); see also 
Center for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, 588 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2009); Incidental Take 
During Specified Activities, 76 Fed. Reg. 47,010 (Aug. 3, 2011). 
 94. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(5)(A)(i)(I); see Kempthorne, 588 F.3d at 710. In applying its 
incidental takings authority, the Service must analyze “reasonably expected” and “reasonably 
likely” effects leading to a “negligible impact,” but bears no obligation to consider speculative 
or uncertain effects. 50 C.F.R. § 18.27(c); accord Kempthorne, 588 F.3d at 710–11. 
 95. See generally Carl Folke, Steve Carpenter, Brian Walker, Marten Scheffer, Thomas 
Elmqvist, Lance Gunderson & C.S. Holling, Regime Shifts, Resilience, and Biodiversity in 
Ecosystem Management, 35 ANN. REV. ECOL. EVOL. & SYSTEMATICS 557 (2004). 
 96. See id. 
 97. In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 234. 
 98. See Chen, supra note 8, at 13–14. 
 99. See, e.g., BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, BIOTECHNOLOGY 
AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE (Charles R. McManis ed., 2007); Charles R. McManis, 
Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge Protection: Thinking 
Globally, Acting Locally, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 547 (2003); Charles R. McManis, 
The Interface of Open Source and Proprietary Agricultural Innovation: Facilitated Access and 
Benefit-Sharing Under the New FAO Treaty, 30 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 405 (2009). 
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The Arctic has been justifiably described as the “last great 
wilderness.”100 Wilderness areas have long offered the promise of 
providing refuges “where the earth and its community of life are 
untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not 
remain.”101 Despite their low levels of biodiversity, the Arctic and 
other cold and/or high-elevation locales may yet prove to be pivotal 
legal battlegrounds in the last-ditch effort to save the earth and its 
diverse forms of life from anthropogenically induced climate change. 
“The project of ameliorating humanity's environmental footprint 
demands humility, wonder, and above all a thorough scientific 
understanding of natural history and humanity’s place in it.”102 
 
 100. See ROGER KAYE, LAST GREAT WILDERNESS: THE CAMPAIGN TO ESTABLISH THE 
ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE (2006). 
 101. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c). 
 102. Jim Chen, Legal Mythmaking in a Time of Mass Extinctions: Reconciling Stories of 
Origins with Human Destiny, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 279, 279 (2005). 
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